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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Murray Casey Carter appeals from the district court's orders denying his request 
for appointment of counsel in seeking Rule 35 relief and his Rule 35 motion. On appeal, 
he asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for appointment of 
counsel, finding his Rule 35 motion to be frivolous, based on clearly erroneous factual 
findings and a misreading of the applicable law. In the alternative, he asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion because it 
improperly limited its discretion by failing to recognize that it had the authority to review 
his entire sentence, not just the fixed portion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Murray Casey Carter was charged, by Information, with attempting to elude a 
police officer, misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants (second 
within ten years) (hereinafter DUI), and driving without privileges. (R., pp.34-36.) 
Mr. Carter and the State reached a plea agreement, under the terms of which Mr. Carter 
would plead guilty to attempting to elude a police officer and DUI, in exchange the State 
would dismiss the driving without privileges charge, and recommend no more than a 
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, for attempting to elude a police 
officer, with any sentence on the DUI to be concurrent. (Tr., p.5, L.16 - p.6, L.24.) 
Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Carter pied guilty to attempting to elude a police officer 
and DUI. (Tr., p.21, Ls.5-22.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a unified sentence of five years, 
with two years fixed, on the attempting to elude charge, and a concurrent sentence of 
1 
one year on the DUI charge. (Tr., p.28, L.21 p.29, L.1.) 
request a specific underlying sentence, but did ask the district court to place Mr. Carter 
on probation. (Tr., p.37, Ls.3-4.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for attempting to elude, and a concurrent 
sentence of one year for DUI. (Tr., p.43, L.17 - p.44, L.5.) 
Mr. Carter filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.57.) 
After filing his Notice of Appeal, Mr. Carter filed a timely Rule 35 motion in which 
he requested that the indeterminate portion of his sentence be reduced from four years 
to two years, which he supported with new information, namely his regular attendance 
at "AA-NA meetings" and Celebrate Recovery meetings while awaiting a transfer to the 
Therapeutic Community. (R., pp.62-64.) He further requested that the district court 
appoint counsel to assist him in seeking Rule 35 relief. (R., pp.68-71.) The district 
court denied his request for appointment of counsel, concluding that the Rule 35 motion 




1. Did the district court err when it refused to appoint counsel based on its 
erroneous conclusion that Mr. Carter's Rule 35 motion was frivolous? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Carter's Rule 35 
motion under the mistaken belief that its review power was limited to considering 




The District Court Erred When It Refused To Appoint Counsel Based On Its Erroneous 
Conclusion That Mr. Carter's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous 
A Introduction 
When the district court denied Mr. Carter's motion for appointment of counsel in 
pursuing his Rule 35 motion, it based its decision on a misstatement of the facts, which 
led to its erroneous conclusion that the Rule 35 motion, which was supported by new 
information, was frivolous. A review of the record and the law leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that the district court committed legal error when it denied Mr. Carter's 
motion for appointment of counsel, finding his Rule 35 motion to be frivolous, in light of 
the clearly erroneous factual findings it made in support of its decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "A determination of whether a motion 
for reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-852(b)(3)[1] is 
based upon the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying documentation that 
may support the motion ... [and] is one of law which we freely review." State v. Wade, 
125 Idaho 522,526 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Refused To Appoint Counsel Based On 
Its Erroneous Conclusion That Mr. Carter's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous 
In denying Mr. Carter's request for the appointment of counsel to assist him in 
pursuing Rule 35 relief, the district court reasoned, 
In this case, the Court sentenced Carter on January 8, 2014, for Count I. 
Eluding a Police Officer, Felony, I.C. § 49-1401 and Count II. Operating a 
Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Second Within Ten 
1 This portion of the statute now appears in subsection (2)(c). 
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Years), Misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 18-8004, -8005(4). Carter complains about 
both the indeterminate portion of four (4) years on Count I and one (1) 
year on Count II, each count running concurrently; Defendant 
Court to reduce his indeterminate time to two (2) years. 
There was a plea agreement for two (2) years fixed, with three (3) years 
indeterminate on Count I; the Court actually reduced the fixed time to one 
(1) year. 
In his Motion, he argues his sentence should be reduced to one (1) year, 
with two (2) years fixed. Based on all of this, the Court finds that the 
Motion "is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate 
means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a 
frivolous proceeding." I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).[2] 
(R., pp.79-80 (underlining in original).) 
The problem with the district court's decision is that it relies on clearly erroneous 
factual findings in concluding that the Rule 35 motion was frivolous. Mr. plea 
agreement did not include a provision that he and the State would jointly recommend a 
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed. Instead, it provided that the State 
would cap its recommendation at no more than five years, with two years fixed, with 
Mr. Carter free to argue for probation. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-22 (defense counsel explaining 
that, under the plea agreement, "the State will recommend a sentence in this matter that 
the Court impose an aggregate five-year sentence, two years fixed followed by three 
indeterminate . . . [and] I'm going to ask the Court to consider placing him on 
probation."); Tr., p.25, Ls.7-11 (the district court, at the sentencing hearing, summarizing 
the agreement as including a promise that "the State was going to cap its 
recommendation on that count [attempting to elude] to five years with two plus - two 
fixed followed by three indeterminate").) 
In reaching its conclusion, the district court cited to Wade, which is particularly 
telling, as Wade involved a plea agreement involving a joint recommendation, which is 
5 
the district court erroneously believed was in Mr. case. In Wade, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the denial of Wade's motion for appointment of counsel 
because his Rule 35 motion was frivolous was correct in light of the fact that the case 
involved a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Wade received the sentence for which he 
bargained, and Wade provided no new information in support of the motion. Wade, 125 
Idaho at 525-26. Mr. Carter's case is easily distinguished from Wade and the district 
court's clearly erroneous factual findings. Not only did his plea agreement not include a 
joint sentencing recommendation, his motion was supported by new information. 
Because the factual findings underlying the district court's order denying 
appointment of counsel on Mr. Carter's Rule 35 were clearly erroneous3 and the legal 
reasoning was unsound, Mr. Carter maintains that the proper relief is to vacate the 
orders denying appointment of counsel and Rule 35 relief, and remand this matter for 
appointment of counsel and reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion after Mr. Carter has 
been assisted by appointed counsel. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Carter's Rule 35 Motion 
Because It Mistakenly Believed That Its Review Power Was Limited To Considering 
Only The Fixed Portion Of His Sentence4 
In denying Rule 35 relief, the district court reasoned, 
The fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the Unified Sentencing Act 
is treated as the term of confinement for sentence review purposes. State 
v. Hayes, 123 Idaho 26, 27, 843 P.2d 675, 676 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
Court finds that a one-year fixed sentence for Eluding, Felony, I.C. 49-
2 The language_quoted by the district court is now contained in subsection (2)(c). 
3 On appeal, findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous." 
See State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789 (1997) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a) and State v. 
Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87 (1993)). 
4 If this Court grants the relief requested in section I, this argument will be moot. 
6 
1401 is lenient considering the facts of this crime and is well within the 
statutory sentence guidelines. 
, p.83.) 
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Carter's Rule 35 
motion because it mistakenly believed that its review of its original sentencing decision 
was limited to the fixed portion of the sentence. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 
600 (1989) (trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to "'act0 within the outer boundaries 
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices"') (citation omitted). The problem with the district court's decision is that it relied 
upon reasoning from the Court of Appeals that has been expressly disavowed by the 
Idaho Supreme Court. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 202-03 (2007) ("We have 
never held that we will not review the aggregate portion of a defendant's sentence to 
see if it is reasonable under the facts of the case when the sentence is appealed."). 
Because the district court's denial of Mr. Carter's Rule 35 motion was based on 
its mistaken belief that its review power was limited, the district court abused its 
discretion in denying Rule 35 relief. As such, Mr. Carter respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the order denying Rule 35 relief, and remand this matter for 
reconsideration under the proper legal standards. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons forth herein, Mr. Carter respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the orders denying appointment of counsel and Rule 35 relief, and remand this 
matter for appointment of counsel and reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion. 
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